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Abstract 
 
Resilience is an increasingly relevant feature of contemporary security policy. It is no longer 
a buzzword, it has turned in recent two decades to an analytical term useful in the study of 
continuity and adaptive change in objects and systems, including social and political systems. 
States and organizations have become increasingly aware of benefits drawn from the 
‘resilience dividend’ for the sake of internal security, public order and systemic stability. 
This paper is dedicated to resilience as an objective and a feature of the European Union as a 
security community. In this respect, resilience is conceived as the capacity of the EU as an 
international organization to prepare for disruptions and to build and reinforce capacity to 
achieve revitalization from past crises and failures. Since resilience is predetermined by 
situational awareness, preparedness, risk assessment and anticipation, intelligence is meant 
to become a core and indispensable form of organized activity of the state or a security 
community. Therefore, the emergence of an EU intelligence community should be identified 
with the growing need to enhance resilience and preparedness of the EU and its member 
states in the face of threats and dangers challenging security, stability and order within the 
Union. A thesis developed in this paper claims that the EU has been developing its joint 
intelligence capabilities with direct reference to resilience building and crisis management 
capabilities as principal mechanisms of security governance in the EU.  
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Introduction 
 
Resilience is an increasingly relevant feature of contemporary security policy. Deeply 
rooted in environmental sciences, it has proliferated across many fields of 
contemporary science. It has also been welcomed by practitioners and decision-
makers as an agile formula of responding to varied challenges, dilemmas and 
contingencies. Built on systemic prerequisites, resilience has explored the issue of 
stability and sustainability of natural ecosystems  focusing on factors and 
mechanisms ensuring adaptive capacity of ecosystems when disturbances, 
disruptions or crises emerge or occur. 
In January 2013 Time magazine declared resilience the ‘environmental 
buzzword’ of 2013 (Walsh 2013). But resilience is no longer a buzzword, it has 
turned in recent two decades to an analytical term useful in the study of continuity 
and adaptive change in objects and systems, including social and political systems. 
As some authors say, it is now ‘a perennial key word for our turbulent, unpredictable, 
transformative 21st century.’ (Almedom, O’Byrne and Jerneck 2015, 9).  
Resilience has also addressed in an appealing and stimulating way the problems of 
individual and organised safety, tackling such key issues as human security, public 
order, crisis management, national security strategies and policies, international 
security.  States and organisations have become increasingly aware of benefits 
drawn from the ‘resilience dividend’ (Rodin 2014) for the sake of internal security, 
public order and systemic stability. Resilience permeated individual and group 
thinking about security in stressful circumstances and as such it drew growing 
attention of institutions and organizations in charge of safety management, crisis 
prevention and mitigation. 
This paper is dedicated to resilience as an objective and a feature of the 
European Union as a security community. In this regard, resilience is conceived as a 
process of building and expanding the capacity of the EU as an international 
organization to prepare for disruptions and to achieve revitalisation from past crises 
and failures. Since resilience is predetermined by situational awareness, 
preparedness, risk assessment and anticipation, intelligence is meant to become a 
core and indispensable form of organized activity of the state or a security 
community. Therefore, the emergence of an EU intelligence community should be 
identified with the growing need to enhance resilience and preparedness of the EU 
and its member states in the face of threats and dangers challenging security, 
stability and order within the Union. A thesis developed in this paper claims that the 
EU has been developing its joint intelligence capabilities with direct reference to 
resilience building and crisis management capabilities as principal mechanisms of 
security governance in the EU.  
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Resilience – an essentially contested concept 
Resilience has become for two decades a concept enjoying sympathy of practitioners 
(politicians, corporate managers, public decision-makers) (Brasset and Vaughan-
Williams 2013) and raising a vast interest within the academic community. Many 
research projects have been conducted and a bulk of scholarly articles and papers 
have been published. Several interesting general and bibliometric papers convincingly 
document the growth of this academic industry (Janssen et al 2006; Janssen, 
Schoon, Ke and Börner 2006; Janssen 2007; Brand and Jax 2007; Walker and 
Cooper 2011; Grimm and Calabrese 2011; Xu and Marinova 2013; Brassett, Croft and 
Vaughan-Williams 2013; Brown 2014; Rogers 2015; Almedom, O’Byrne and Jerneck 
2015; Dunn Cavelty, Kaufmann and Kristensen  2015). Resilience has become the 
phenomenon studied in many scientific areas and disciplines, such diverse as 
economics, mathematics, engineering, medicine, urban studies, environmental 
sciences, psychology, pedagogy, geography, management sciences, sociology, 
philosophy, security studies. The review of concepts made by de Van Breda (2001), 
Bruijne, Boin and van Eeten (2010), Walker and Cooper (2011), Kolar (2011) Brown 
(2014) and Schmidt (2015) provides extensively evidences on the variety and 
multiplicity of the meanings, approaches and perspectives. 
In spite of the amassing scholarship, it has remained an essentially contested 
concept since it has been tested in the whole lot of cases ranging from ecological 
sustainability to political philosophy and more often causing a cognitive confusion 
due to the huge diversity of the concepts, meanings and definitions proliferating 
across different disciplines, theories and practices. Having originated in behavioral 
sciences, it was adopted and developed in the 1970s in theoretical and practical 
ecology, thanks to Crawford S. Holling’s path-breaking article (Holling 1973), and in 
social sciences, owing to Friedrich August von Hayek’s contribution to complex 
systems theory and the concept of the market as complex ecosystem  (Walker and 
Cooper 2011, 148-149).  Contemporary security studies adopted the concept of 
resilience quite belatedly. Thanks to Aaron Wildavsky (1988), the notion of resilience 
debuted in the vocabulary of safety sciences and then nested in such fields as, 
obviously, environmental security, and also risk management, safety engineering, 
policing studies, development studies and even critical security studies. 
For the purposes of this paper, the conceptual framing of resilience is focused 
on some key elements of contemporary security as an institutionalised organisational 
practice performed in a very ‘high-noise’ environment. These elements are present in 
the definitional content of resilience including such cognate terms as: sustainability, 
adaptability, recovery, permanence, robustness, persistence, resistance, readiness, 
preparedness. These descriptors refer to resilience as a systemic property of 
structural security environment prone to fluctuations and changes over time. 
Departing from the classical Holling’s and  Wildavsky’s definitions, resilience means 
the capacity of a system to cope with unanticipated dangers after they have become 
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manifest, to absorb change and disturbance and to learn to bounce back by 
reorganization and change ensuring the maintenance of essentially the same 
function, structure, identity, and feedbacks (Wildavsky 1988, 77, Holling 1973, 14; 
Walker, Holling et al 2004, 2; Edwards 2009, 18).  Hence, resilience is pertinent to 
stability and robustness of a system, preparedness for unpredictabilities, unintended 
consequences and  boomerang effects generated by dynamic, volatile and 
sometimes turbulent environment. As Lentzos and Rose highlight, resilience consists 
in ‘a systematic, widespread, organizational, structural and personal strengthening of 
subjective and material arrangements so as to be better able to anticipate and 
tolerate disturbances in complex worlds without collapse, to withstand shocks, and to 
rebuild as necessary.’ (Lentzos and Rose 2009, 243) Resilience can be seen as a 
process  in which an entity – an individual, a community, an organisation - maintains 
basic functionalities when confronted with a serious disruption, outbreak or randomly 
emerging existential threat.  It is conceived as a  ‘measure of a system’s persistence 
and its ability to absorb change and disturbance but still maintain the same 
relationships among population or state variables’ (Allen, Gunderson and Holling 
2010, 5). So, resilience can be captured in a simplistic and radical wording as a 
special ability to react to traumatic or catastrophic events and its aftermaths ‘as if 
nothing ever happened’. 
Resilience can be conceptualised in two corresponding perspectives which can 
be merged in a cross-referential matrix. The first variable is the dynamic of security 
environment in which resilience is manifested. Here we can distinguish two forms: 
static and active. The former highlights stability as the key feature of a security 
system; the latter underlines the inherent unpredictability of system behavior. The 
second variable is the type of reaction to acute security problems in the temporal 
dimension. The emergence of a disruption, breakdown or disaster is the critical 
position in the timeline dividing the system dynamics in two main phases: pre-crisis 
prevention and post-crisis reaction.   
 
Table 1. Variables of resilience   
 
 
  
Static 
 
 
Active 
 
 
Prevention 
 
 
preparedness 
 
anticipation 
 
Reaction 
 
 
recovery 
 
transformation 
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The static form builds on the lexical meaning of resilience as ‘the ability to 
bounce or spring back into shape, position, etc.’ (Webster’s 1986,  1210). Resilience 
depends on stability, balance, firmness. Alegorically, it can be depicted as a lonely 
house hit by terrible storm, resisting powerful hurricane wind and slanting rainfall, 
suffering certain damages and losses, but keeping its construction firm and 
unshaken, fulfilling thus successfully its essential function: protecting its inhabitants, 
ensuring they are safe and sound, safeguarding their material goods and resources. 
When the storm is over, some recovery is needed and repair mechanisms are put 
into action. So, the static approach is focused on stability rebalancing, recovery, 
bouncing back, return to ‘normalcy’.  The structural properties of security system in 
the pre-crisis conditions serve as a reference point and provide benchmarks for 
recovery action in the post-crisis circumstances. 
The pre-crisis resilience refers to the capacity of awareness building in the 
face of potential and probable shocks and disruptions.  It is associated with the 
management of surprise (Wildavsky 1988, 98). It is the ability to detect 
contingencies, identify random events and key risk factors (Kaplan 2002, 26-29) and 
enhance predictability in complex environment. This entails descriptive prediction and 
prescriptive planning on the basis of a deliberate framed-up strategy and 
commensurate scenarios articulating unknowns and uncertainties (Hukkinen, 2008: 
102). The scenarios and plans explore the identified vulnerabilities of the system and 
calculate the related risks. Vulnerability, as Aradau and van Munster note, is a good 
risk indicator but is not completely adequate for analysing responses to sudden 
changes or catastrophic events. They underline that ‘the goal of preparedness is not 
just to reduce vulnerability but to foster resilience.’ (Aradau and van Munster 2011, 
46). If we conceive of vulnerability as a predisposition to negative outcomes, 
susceptibility to persistent risks and unknowns, then we consider it a  ‘harbinger’ of 
emergencies and disruptions which implies various forms of preparation and 
safeguarding. Preparedness must employ dedicated ways and means of handling the 
issue of systemic vulnerabilities by recurring to resilience as the property of 
dedicated security measures. It can be regarded as a set of instruments and 
techniques implemented by the government in the framework of security measures 
established to deal with emergencies and disasters (Neocleous 2013, 190). 
Preparedness is then the process of systemic capacity building  in the pre-crisis 
phase with regard to defence against and resistance to  the effects  of a disruption or 
a crisis. It has to do with the management of available resources (material, financial, 
information, communication) in a way that ensures an enhanced ability to confront 
an immediate disruptive change or a sudden breakdown. 
Recovery and reconstruction are another important aspects of the static form 
of resilience. Rodin, for instance, sees resilience as a component of crisis 
management cycle, highlights its importance in the post-disaster conditions. She 
conceives it as a capacity developed during emergencies or in crisis circumstances 
that could not have been avoided or prevented, a sort of lessons-learnt approach to 
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both future challenges and crises to come. She refers to the ‘resilience dividend’ as a 
value added to the general crisis management system enabling a quick and effective 
return to normalcy after a breakdown and fostering a systemic adjustment or even a 
‘significant transformation that yields benefits even when disruptions are not 
occurring.’ (Rodin 2014, 12). So, she builds a link between the static and active 
responses to disruptions, crises or turmoils.  
Rodin notes that sometimes bouncing back is not sufficient, the damage 
caused in the system is too big to reconstruct the previous setting and ensure its 
stability and proper performance (Rodin 2014, 12). This argument draws from 
Holling’s obervation on stability as equilibrium. There has been a thread in resilience 
theory addressing the value of equilibrium for system stability and maintenance. 
Some authors conceived of bouncing back as  ‘the return of a system to an 
equilibrium state following disturbance’ (Allen, Gunderson and Holling 2010, 5). In a 
similar vein, Grimm and Calabrese, who studied resilience of complex systems, 
asserted that resilience is one of stability properties of equilibrium-centred systems 
(Grimm and Calabrese 2011, 6). However, Holling in his original paper already 
noticed that ‘an equilibrium centred view is essentially static and provides little 
insight into the transient behavior of systems that are not bear the equilibrium’ 
(Holling 1973, 2, 15). We completely subscribe to Holling’s reflection, especially as 
far as contemporary security systems are concerned. We also follow Walker and 
Cooper who claim that resilience is the ‘acceptance of disequilibrium as a principle of 
organization’ (Walker and Cooper 2011: 154). 
Therefore, resilience embodies the transformative capability of the system 
exposed to sudden threats, pressures and tensions so as to prevent an emergency or 
disruption, avoid a looming crisis and keep security mechanisms running properly. 
The transformative power is even more important in the post-crisis phase. It entails a 
good deal of measures and means aiming to adjust the system to new conditions 
and factors determining the overall performance of security mechanisms and 
procedures. It corresponds with the past experiences and lessons learnt but it also 
looks forward to handling present dangers and cope with problems to come. 
Resilience then means the capacity of ‘being able to come away from the event with 
an even greater capacity to prevent and contain future errors’ (Weick, Sutcliffe, and 
Obstfeld 2002, 14 quoted in de Bruijne, Boin and van Eeten 2010, 23). It also 
consists in stimulating positive feedbacks within the complex security system and 
increasing protective skills of its institutional components. 
Another aspect of the active form of resilience refers to prevention of 
catastrophic events and disruptive changes through the use of anticipatory 
techniques and early warning mechanisms. Planning and foresight have always been 
considered relevant factors enhancing resilience as a preventative measure. The fear 
of a fundamental unanticipated surprise has represented a major challenge to 
resilience (Wears and Webb 2014, 42). An active approach to this challenging issue 
requires the application of anticipatory measures. Pre-cautionary and forward-looking 
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tools and techniques aim to build up a picture or a scenario of future developments. 
Awareness of dysfunctional elements of security systems stimulates proactive 
maintenance and disaster mitigation. So the wish to confront the threats before they 
materialise and turn to present dangers or disruptive changes has been the essence 
of anticipatory approaches and measures. 
Aaron Wildavsky opposed anticipation to resilience. He conceived anticipation 
as a kind of efforts made ‘to predict and prevent potential dangers before damage is 
done.’ Resilience instead is meant as ‘the capacity to cope with unanticipated 
dangers after they have become manifest’ (Wildavsky 1988, 77). He added that 
anticipation seeks to avoid hypothesized hazards and concluded that both 
anticipation and resilience are well suited to different conditions. Anticipation makes 
sense under substantial certainty and predictability (Wildavsky 1988, 79-80). Using a 
vocabulary popularised fifteen years after (Rumsfeld 2011; 2013), anticipation is 
about ‘known unknowns’ while resilience is about ‘unknown unknowns’. Both require 
a full situational assessment of endogenous and exogenous variables and analytical 
insights into the structure and dynamics of the security environment.  
Holling pointed out that the behavior of ecological system – and one can 
extend this remark on social and security systems – was ‘profoundly affected by 
random events.’ (Holling 1973, 13). The latter disclaimer is correct but it does not 
mean that resilience is tested in totally unpredictable circumstances and realized only 
post factum. As we have already noted, preparedness and anticipation are two facets 
of the preventative form of resilience. They start from the assumption that the future 
is predictable and that some advanced security systems are able to calculate through 
a wide range of tools and techniques the probability that a threat, a disruption or a 
catastrophe will occur (Anderson 2010, 783-784). 
The real challenge for these systems is the increasing complexity and 
uncontrollability of security area. The more complex system, the harder it is to 
anticipate its outcomes. Comfort and others rightly underlined the consequences  of 
increasing complexity for the organisational performance of public and private 
organisations. They stressed that: ‘Increases in organized complexity require 
significant increases in information flow, communication, and coordination in order to 
integrate multiple levels of operation and diverse requirements for decision into a 
coherent program of action.’ (Comfort et al 2001, 144). Therefore, anticipation 
should enhance the abilities to detect, monitor, respond and learn. Hollnagel wrote: 
‘Learning can be used to improve the ability to respond, to select appropriate 
indicators and cues and also to hone the imagination that provides the basis of 
anticipation. Monitoring can primarily be used to improve the ability to respond 
(increased readiness, preventive responses). And responding can provide the 
experience that is necessary to improve learning as well as anticipation.’ (Hollnagel 
2014, 189). 
The above described matrix of ‘resilience in action’ presents a heuristic 
viewpoint that resilience writ large cannot be confined to the capacity to cope with 
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unanticipated occurrences which might bring about negative consequences for 
stability and performance of an entity. In our perspective, resilience entails 
inevitability of systemic disruptions or outbreaks due to imperfect organisational 
networks, ineffective communication channels and distorted information flow. 
However, resilience implies a dynamic approach to dysfunctional and crisis-prone 
elements of the environment. It highlights the importance of adaptability and 
constructive recovery as well as anticipatory skills and preventative abilities acquired 
through the extensive use of knowledge management, information analysis and 
learning. 
 
Resilience and intelligence – an intimate relationship 
 
The general concept of resilience alludes to information, knowledge and awareness 
as structural elements of the security environment. Wildavsky wrote about general 
resources, such as knowledge, education, wealth, energy, communication 
(Wildavsky, 1988, 13). We will focus on information, knowledge and intelligence as 
the most important among ‘general resources’, considering them as ‘strategic 
resources’ indispensable for resilience building in the contemporary complex 
networked security environment.  
Evans and Reid (2013: 95) remark that: ‘What resilience preaches is the 
impossibility and folly of even thinking we might resist danger and, instead, accept 
the necessity of living a life of permanent exposure to endemic dangers’. Contrary to 
this assumption, we claim that the permanent exposure to perils, risks, and hazards, 
inevitable and ‘natural’ in a sense, does not limit resistance capabilities and chances 
for an effective defence and constructive reaction in the face of a danger, a 
disruption or a collapse. Intelligence, conceived as the use of information and 
knowledge for analysis and assessment of the existing vital problems with the aim of 
helping to manage or solve them, is an activity which contributes to resilience 
building and maintenance. Resilience entails predictive abilities and so does 
intelligence. Resilience requires a clear picture of the complex environment; 
intelligence is focused on providing necessary information, knowledge and analysis 
used for a comprehensive assessment of a given aspect of the reality. Resilience 
addresses the issue of systemic vulnerabilities at the stage of preparedness; 
intelligence seeks to reduce long-term vulnerabilities in a strategic perspective. 
Resilience is juxtaposed with anticipation as two opposing features of dynamic 
uncertain environment, ‘two strategic alternatives for securing safety (...).’ 
(Wildavsky 1988, 8). Intelligence has decisively shifted towards anticipation and 
strategic forecast; resilience corresponds to anticipation as a complementary capacity 
enabling a better identification and assessment of risks and threats. The value of 
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intelligence is in its predictive capacity, anticipatory power and early warning 
capability that facilitates policy planning, strategic assessment and proper 
understanding of developments and trends in the future. 
Evans and Reid (2013, 91-92) note that one of the effects of resilience is the 
importance of shared knowledge and information in responding to the logic of 
development of living systems determined by constant exposure to threats and 
systemic shocks. Hence, to be resilient means to know what are the critical variables 
and key parameters of the security ecosystem and to know how to detect, identify 
and evaluate factors undermining potentially or effectively the stability and efficiency 
of the system. Resilient systems must rely on systematic, reliable  and effective 
means and modes of information management and knowledge sharing. This kind of 
activities can be realized in a certain institutional setting and must involve specialised 
agencies with clear-cut competences, specific skills and proper tools. This 
requirement in the case of complex security systems can be met only be an 
organised, efficient and cohesive set of intelligence services responsible for managing 
the vast area of communication and information available from open, secret and 
sensitive sources. Such an institutional arrangement may be called intelligence 
community if it serves the shared strategic objectives, ensures interconnectivity of its 
elements and enables a constant and smooth information and intelligence workflow.  
It is a commonly shared argument that intelligence as an institution and also 
as a process of information management emerged in response to natural existential 
anxieties (Wheaton and Beerbower 2006, 329). Fear, uncertainty, distrust, 
unpredictability have accompanied the nation-, state- and community-builiding 
processes. As one of intelligence scholars observed, ‘The purpose of intelligence 
since time immemorial has been to reduce uncertainty about the aspirations, 
intentions, capabilities, and actions of adversaries, political rivals, and, sometimes, 
partners and allies.’ (Fingar 2011, 6) Intelligence, according to Manosevitz (2013, 
15), helps policymakers to avoid surprise, understand evolving situation, as well as 
identify opportunities to advance national objectives or avoid risks to vital security 
interests. It is then corresponding to resilience objectives in terms of preparedness, 
situational awareness or contingency planning. Also, it takes up the issue of alerting 
and early warning as methods activating resilient elements of the security system. In 
strategic terms, intelligence prepares long-term assessments and situation trends but 
also provides warning of immediate threats to vital security interests (Johnson and 
Wirtz 2004, 2). Some scholars claim that ‘Intelligence is more about early warning, 
strategic foresight, and real-time decision support for cooperative risk management 
than about gaining a secret advantage over a single state adversary.’ (Sullivan 2007, 
17). It may entail global and sectoral situational estimates, threat assessments and 
risk analyses.  But it also has to develop alerting and threat warning in order to 
launch crisis management activities in early-warning stage. Foreseeing and alerting 
discontinuities in preparedness and resilience are of utmost importance for the 
general performance of the complex security system (Grabo 2002; Waltz 2003). 
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Sometimes intelligence brings forth a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’, i.e. contributing 
to resilience building through information analysis and intelligence production, it may 
also raise awareness of potential enemies or hostile actors and encourage them to 
look for weak points or shortcomings of the security system. Paradoxically, ‘resilience 
fosters an exposure to the catastrophic’ (Evans and Reid 2014, 48). Intelligence, 
then, has to strive to discern actions or developments that were not anticipated or 
put on an indicator list, which ‘in fact may be unique to the particular situation and 
might not occur another time.’ (Grabo 2002, 27). Following Julian Richards we can 
point at a very important feature of intelligence as an ingredient of resilience, i.e. its 
forward-looking and predictive capacities. Organising intelligence around these 
functions is hard and demanding because it consists in the ‘use of analysis of 
fragmented information and modelling of past activities and behaviours  to predict 
what might happen in the future.’ (2010, 23). It has to do with the learning aspect of 
resilience, i.e. the ability to draw lessons and innovate. Knowledge management and 
learning processes should  ensure that intelligence is focused on relevant threats and 
risks and can effectively frame strategic policies, priorities and resource, thus giving 
key support to resilience (Akhgar, Yates and Lockley 2013, 6). Predictive capacities 
reduce the level of uncertainty and facilitate resilience building in its preparatory 
phase. 
The immense proliferation of intelligence methods, means and tools across 
different layers of contemporary complex security systems has shown the growing 
importance of information gathering, processing and analysing, especially with 
reference to vital security interests of the states and their societies. For an effective 
resilience, it has been evident that the growing interconnectivity of information 
sources may bring about both positive and negative outcomes. However, it is taken 
for granted that such a situation stimulates various forms of cooperation in 
collecting, processing and sharing available information and data.  
Contemporary security systems must cope adequately with  complexity, 
diversity and wide range of activities undertaken by countless participants of public 
life. Accurate intelligence is essential for an effective and legitimate security 
management and is equally important for organisational performance. This rule is 
binding on both the state and an international organisation. 
 
The EU intelligence community as a resilience provider 
 
Current security challenges for the European Union as an international organisation 
and as a community of its member states require a consistent, pro-active, 
intelligence-led response. This politically motivated objective has to be shared by EU 
institutions and agencies and should engage the member states into a more intense 
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cooperation. Hence, data exchange, intelligence sharing and intelligence-led 
operations make up a specific security zeitgeist which inspires national and 
supranational counterparts to make stronger efforts and invest their resources to the 
making of a strategic intelligence community within the EU. Recent developments 
have just proved the well-known principle of knowledge dominance in the realm of 
security and made the public aware of the size, scope and depth of state policies in 
this regard. The EU is no exception and it has shown that the proposals and 
initiatives undertaken in recent years were timely and adequate to the emerging 
problems of information analysis, knowledge management and intelligence sharing. 
The proliferation of threats to security demands a functional intelligence architecture. 
The European Union has responded to this challenge gradually developing 
connections and linkages between relevant authorities of the member states and 
carefully yet systematically engaging available EU agencies and bodies in 
intelligence-led cooperation. 
At the end of the 1990s  EU member states along with relevant EU institutions 
and units started the building of an intelligence community on the basis of effective 
rendering of time-sensitive intelligence, development of estimation and analysis 
capabilities and sharing of best practices and analytical products. This decision was 
caused by the consequences of the evolution of post-Cold War global security 
environment, in particular the proliferation of transnational and cross-border threats 
increasingly affecting the integration process within the EU. The creation of the 
Schengen free-travel area obliged the member states to put more emphasis on 
cross-border cooperation in preventing and fighting crime as well as reinforcing their 
frontiers and modernise border infrastructure. Information and data exchanged 
between police officers, border guards and intelligence services of the member states 
was growing in numbers and relevance, overcoming thereby some member states’ 
reservations and reluctance to a further cooperation  in intelligence field. Moreover, 
EU heads of state or government in a follow-up to several bi- and multilateral summit 
meetings in the late 1990s and early 2000s highlighted the need to develop 
intelligence collection and analysis capabilities as a necessary component of the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (Villadsen 2000). 
These requirements were evident in the traumatic year 2003 when the EU, 
despite ‘transatlantic rift’ over US-led military invasion on Iraq, managed to launch its 
first military missions (in Macedonia and DR Congo), to make arrangements with 
NATO under the Berlin Plus agreement and articulate its global outlook in a single 
document - the European Security Strategy (ESS). The latter heralded an ambitious 
project of assuming by the EU a new global role in waging active policies to counter 
the new dynamic threats. 
The events of 11 September 2001 highlighted the critical importance of 
intelligence for effective prevention and combating of terrorism and transnational 
crime. Efforts aimed to encourage a more intense and effective exchange of criminal 
information and intelligence did not, however, yield the expected results, mostly due 
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to the lack of unanimity and the deficit of trust among the member states. In the 
immediate aftermaths of the 11 March 2004 terrorist attack in Madrid, EU institutions 
placed particular emphasis on the exchange of information and intelligence between 
law enforcement authorities of the member states and called for the improvement of 
mechanisms for cooperation and the promotion of effective systematic collaboration 
between police, security and intelligence services (Friedrichs 2008; Deflem 2010; 
Argomaniz 2011).  
Having reviewed thoroughly the obstacles to an effective exchange of 
information between law enforcement authorities in member states, the European 
Commission in 2004 concluded that they can only be effectively addressed on the 
basis of a firm commitment of member states to set up a European Criminal 
Intelligence Model (ECIM). This model comprised a common methodology of a 
reliable threat assessment. It rendered intelligence-led law enforcement effective and 
allowed for enhanced cooperation in the field of prevention and fight against 
terrorism and other forms of organised crime (Brady 2008; Kaunert 2010; Gruszczak 
2013). The concept of the European criminal intelligence took shape of an 
intelligence cycle which relied on inputs from Europol and the member states 
contributing either directly or through appropriate institutional or working schemes 
as provided in EU law.  
The concept of ECIM was taken into consideration in the EU Internal Security 
Strategy (EU ISS) adopted in early 2010 to further improve security in the EU, 
protect safety of citizens of the Union and tackle organised crime, terrorism and 
other threats. The strategy highlighted prevention and anticipation as mechanisms 
aimed to detect future threats and prevent their happening. It called member states 
to foster information exchange on a basis of mutual trust  and share intelligence in 
time in compliance with the principle of information availability. 
The EU Internal Security Strategy provided a strategic framework and broad 
guidelines for a comprehensive approach to effective intelligence-led policing and 
enhanced criminal intelligence cooperation among EU member states with a direct 
and active involvement of competent EU agencies and bodies (Gruszczak 2013). It 
laid solid grounds for criminal intelligence  conceived as a critical element of 
evidence-based cooperation in the area of internal security in the EU, supported by 
the best available assessments and risk analyses, and overwhelmingly accepted 
patterns of resilience (Kaunert 2010). 
A comprehensive response to the challenges of resilience building and security 
governance in the EU called for the making of a genuine EU intelligence community 
on the basis of scattered institutional and functional arrangements. Due to the 
existing legal, institutional and strategic divisions, the EU intelligence community had 
to adjust to a network configuration of security interests of EU member states 
expressed at the national level as well as through relevant EU institutions and bodies. 
The objectives and missions realized in the framework of the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) retained their specific character, especially in the field of 
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information gathering and analysis as well as intelligence sharing. Military intelligence 
in the EU has been directly and thoroughly bound up with the CSDP. Therefore, it 
has reflected specific strategic, organisational, functional and political prerequisites 
which are deeply nested in ideological construction of EU identity (Kølvraa 2010) and 
the formation of the EU’s actorness in international and global dimensions. 
Intelligence capacities for the purposes of EU CSDP have been largely 
dependent on the member states. Although the value and importance of open source 
information gradually increased, defence intelligence organisations from EU member 
states have had the pivotal role in determining the real input and workflow of 
information and intelligence within the EU CSDP. CSDP missions and operations also 
involved crisis management and early warning, mostly due to the ‘expeditionary’ 
dimension of EU crisis management capabilities. Some elements of early warning and 
crisis prevention can be also found in the EU’s common foreign policy and external 
relations as well as in internal security cooperation. Socio-cultural intelligence 
adopted in support of the EU’s diplomacy and external relations consisted in 
collecting and analysing a plenty of data and information referring to crises, 
emergencies and hazards occurring outside the European Union yet having 
considerable, often serious or negative, impact on EU policy, identity or security. 
Exogenous threats like terrorism, organised crime, illegal migration or cyber attacks 
had to be anticipated and possibly prevented from occurring. EU internal security 
cooperation, though focused on criminal intelligence analysis, entailed also elements 
of situational intelligence acquired from early warning systems and strategic 
assessment mechanisms. 
The mosaic of security fields in the EU determined the institutional setting and 
functional arrangements of EU intelligence community. Military intelligence has been 
concentrated in the EU Military Staff (EUMS). Its Intelligence Directorate relies 
principally on classified contributions from military intelligence services of the 
member states. The provision of information and analytical materials is limited and 
confined to need-to-know procedures. Strategic intelligence production in the EUMS 
is supported by the all-source analysis for the purposes of situational awareness, 
threat assessment and anticipatory capacity of policy-making. The Intelligence 
Directorate receives information from all CSDP crisis management missions, including 
data identified and recorded personally by officials participating in a given mission. It 
is also fed by other EU agencies, namely the EU Satellite Centre (SatCen) and the EU 
Intelligence Analysis Centre (IntCen), which provide the EUMS with geospatial 
intelligence (SatCen) and analytical products prepared on the basis of inputs 
provided by national civilian intelligence services (IntCen). 
Visual observation and surveillance, as well as geospatial analysis of physical 
features and geographically referenced activities in the area of military operations 
and crisis management became widely implemented as a result of technological 
advancement and wider access to geospatial data (Darnis and Veclani 2011, 5-9). 
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The EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (IntCen) is a unit active in the field of 
CSDP but it also deals with problems of internal security, like trafficking of arms or 
terrorism (House of Lords 2003; Bigo et al 2007). It is a kind of facilitator for civilian 
intelligence services with regard to the exchange of security-related processed 
information (Davis Cross 2013). It works on open source material, military (thanks to 
cooperation with the EUMS) and non-military intelligence as well as diplomatic 
reporting. It has focused on the matters related to the CSDP, crisis management 
missions, forthcoming military and civilian operations, and immediate reactions to 
new threats which should be tackled by the mixture of military and civilian 
instruments (Müller-Wille 2008).  
The Crisis Response System (CRS) established within the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) deals with emerging or enduring crises and supports the 
political decision making with regard to a given crisis situation. The CRS is tasked 
with an effective implementation of standard procedures in the context of the EU's 
ability to tackle crises and tensions taking place outside the EU or generated inside 
the Union by external drivers, which may affect EU security interests. Information 
sharing is one of the priorities of the Crisis Response System. Two components of 
the CRS are particularly engaged in information management and sharing among the 
member states and relevant EU institutions and bodies. They are the EU Situation 
Room (SitRoom) and the Crisis Platform. The Situation Room is responsible for 
channelling, selecting, collating and verifying all-source information available on crisis 
situations (Miozzo 2014). It is the only 24/7 capability at the EU level acting as a 
permanent switchboard for the EEAS and the European Commission, enabling the 
delivery of accurate and up-to-date crisis-related information to the decision makers. 
It draws information from all available sources, including open sources, EU 
delegations, Member States, EU CSDP Operations and Missions, EU Special 
Representatives’ teams, EEAS exploratory missions, and relevant international 
organisations (Nimark and Pawlak 2014; High Representative 2011). 
The EU Crisis Platform is an ad hoc undertaking activated and chaired by the 
High Representative of the Union for the Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-
President of the European Commission (HR/VP) within the institutional framework of 
the EEAS and connected with relevant Commission services and General Secretariat 
of the Council. It aims to provide adequate and timely response to external crises 
requiring a coordinated action at the EU level. It seeks to facilitate information-
sharing amongst participants during all phases of an ongoing crisis. The Crisis 
Platform collects, processes and disseminates to participants information and 
analyses relating to the most relevant aspects of a given crisis situation, including 
political issues, economic situation, social relations, military issues, humanitarian 
concerns and international environment. It enables EU officials and national experts 
invited to the Platform to get access to well-ordered and streamlined knowledge and 
also to keep information circulating among different institutional stakeholders.  
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Military and civilian intelligence sectors within the EEAS meet within the format 
of the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC). The SIAC was established with 
the aim of pooling civilian intelligence obtained by the IntCen with intelligence 
provided by the EUMS with regard to early warning and situation assessment (Jones 
2012, 3; van Buuren 2009, 10; Norheim-Martinsen 2013, 98). The SIAC is collating, 
processing and analysing inputs coming from various sources: military and civilian 
Intelligence services of the member states, diplomatic missions of the EU (EU Special 
Representatives, Commission representations), ESDP Missions and international 
organisations, like the UN or the OSCE. Moreover, the SIAC can be fed by dedicated 
EU agencies, like SatCen, and can draw information from open sources. This 
cooperation allows the both the EUMS and the IntCen to operate jointly and to 
combine their analysis tools, generating a wide range of intelligence products from 
different sources (Haag and Anaya 2011, 8; Kozłowski and Palacios-Coronel 2014, 
10).  
EU internal security policy is founded on an intelligence-led policing model. It  
represents a pro-active approach to threat assessment and risk management on the 
part of relevant EU agencies and the majority of the member states, reflecting the 
growing importance of prevention and anticipation in the field of EU internal security. 
Intelligence-driven co-operation among national police and other law enforcement 
agencies became a showcase of modern transnational policing in the EU. The model 
of intelligence-led policing at EU level is grounded on specific functional and 
institutional synergies suitable to EU legal and institutional framework as well as 
national interests and perspectives of the member states. 
The underlying function of intelligence-led policing is to anticipate crime trends 
and proactively create effective prevention strategies (Guidetti and Martinelli 2009). 
It may be also conceived as a ‘type of law enforcement in which resources are 
deployed based on information gathered and analyzed from criminal intelligence.’ 
(White 2009, 423). Intelligence-led policing therefore should be seen as a 
collaborative enterprise based on improved intelligence operations and community-
oriented policing and problem solving (Peterson 2005; Ratcliffe 2008), which is 
particularly suitable to the multi-level architecture of EU cooperation in police and 
criminal justice. 
Europol is an EU agency endowed with enhanced capabilities in the area of 
information management, intelligence production and sharing, as well as operational 
support for the Member States. Europol has been tasked to lead the further 
development of the European Criminal Intelligence Model (ECIM). In this regard, it 
has develop a common EU approach for targeted collection and sharing of key 
criminal information, integrated analysis of financial intelligence linked to all crime 
phenomena, identification of top criminal targets. It also improved and strengthened 
the methodology of organised crime threat assessment (OCTA) being a part of the 
EU policy cycle for organised and serious international crime, established in 2010 on 
the basis of the intelligence-led policing approach.  
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Europol was designated as the ‘central EU capability to receive, store and 
analyse this collected information’ and to support operational activities of the 
Member States based on Europol’s earlier strategic assessments. Europol has been 
equipped with enhanced capabilities in the area of information management, 
intelligence production and sharing. It delivers regular threat assessments and 
situation estimates with regard to terrorism and organised crime (Bures 2011, 96; 
Deflem 2006; Deflem 2010). 
 EU internal security has often been focused on the peripheral areas, territories 
bordering with third countries and separated by external borders of EU member 
states. The EU established in 2005 Frontex agency for the management of 
operational cooperation at the external borders of the member states (Neal 2009). 
The extensive field of Frontex’s competences includes collection and analysis of 
information concerning the situation at the external borders and distribution of tailor-
made intelligence products to relevant customers with the aim of providing as 
complete picture as possible of external risks and threats, building situational 
awareness and predicting future trends. 
Frontex has used several analytical tools for risk analysis and situational 
intelligence at the external borders. Amongst them, the most important is the 
Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM). Initially, it was based on a six-field 
matrix, bringing together elements of criminal intelligence and risk assessment 
(Carrera 2007, 15-16). CIRAM was updated in 2011 in order to better respond to the 
changing external environment of the EU, to deal effectively with new types of risks 
and threats and to reflect the legal changes, both of which emphasised risk analysis 
as a key tool in ensuring the optimal allocation of resources and efficiency of 
equipment (Frontex 2013a, 11). Most importantly, Frontex is authorised to collect 
and process personal data of individuals who are subject to operational activities 
conducted or commanded by Frontex, like joint return operations, pilot projects and 
rapid interventions at the external borders. Collated information, including personal 
data, is further processed for strategic and operational purposes as well as a 
contribution to the analytical and operational work of other EU law enforcement 
agencies, mainly Europol. 
Currently CIRAM is characterised by a management approach to risk analysis 
that defines risk as a function of the threat, vulnerability and impact (Frontex 2013a, 
11). It is utilised for strategic and operational purposes. Concerning the latter, it 
supports the coordination of joint operations at the external borders conducted or 
coordinated by Frontex. It provides a background for an overall assessment of 
conditions, determinants and circumstances existing in the area of a planned joint 
operation at EU external borders. This picture is a sort of security landscape and is 
drawn on the basis of vast data flow containing various detailed information 
delivered by operational personnel made available by the Member States as well as 
acquired from public  sources. This type of analysis is focused on identifying areas 
and sources of elevated risk or imminent threats and deciphering migratory routes, 
17 
 
the main nationalities or countries of origin of migrants as well as modi operandi of 
criminal groups or smuggling networks operating in the area of Frontex’s planned 
activities. 
To be effective and reliable in its analytical properties, CIRAM relies on a four-
tier access control model that involves gathering information from numerous sources 
dispersed over the territory of EU member states. To this end, the Frontex Risk 
Analysis Network (FRAN) was established in 2007. It provides the framework for 
sharing knowledge and producing analytical and strategic reports on the current 
state of play at the external borders linking the intelligence networks of individual 
countries with Frontex (Frontex 2013b). The cooperative framework of the FRAN and 
its subsidiary, the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-
RAN), feeds Frontex Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) with data which are processed, 
analysed and disseminated in form of analytical products. The most important are 
quarterlies, semi-annual and annual risk analyses. Moreover,  RAU issues occasional 
documents and other tailored risk-analysis products. 
Risk analysis model implemented by Frontex reflects pro-active approach to 
public order and internal security of the EU. It is mostly dealing with the problem of 
increasing criminality at EU external borders, taking form of transnational organized 
criminal networks involved in trafficking in human beings (Seiffarth 2011). This is 
why Frontex’s methodology combines quantitative risk analysis, which relies on 
mathematical models and techniques to identify, quantify and manage exposures, 
with qualitative risk management, which focuses primarily on experience, judgment 
and common sense. However, the prevalence of quantitative data in Frontex’s  
analytical tradecraft suggests that the agency is focused on ‘hard’ border security 
issues that could underpin cost-benefit approach to EU immigration and asylum 
policies. In this respect, selective differentiation at the external borders seeks to 
facilitate information management and enhance risk analysis capabilities of Frontex 
as well as national risk assessment units in the Member States. 
 
Conclusions  
 
The EU’s experience in the building of intelligence community has proven the 
increasing significance of information management and intelligence sharing for 
resilience of the EU as a complex security system. Resilience entails the growing 
preventive capacities, anticipatory techniques and contingency measures; all require 
firm, substantial and continuous access to knowledge and information of critical 
security problems. The EU has been trying to acquire an added value linking 
tremendous amount of information sources located in the member states and 
building synergetic connections and functional interactions among variegated 
stakeholders. 
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Boin, Ekengren and Rhinard (2014) identified a wide array of EU institutional 
settings and working arrangements comprising 84 systems and tools dedicated to 
gathering, analysing and sharing information only in the area of crisis management. 
Even if only a few of them deal with full-fledged intelligence, the impressive number 
and variety of EU ‘sense-making’ arrangements underscore their relevance for early 
warning, crisis management, threat prevention and, finally, resilience building. 
Intelligence cooperation developed recently in the EU has been characterised 
by the progressive adaptation and implementation of qualitative and quantitative 
methods of data analysis and information management by competent EU agencies 
and units, most of all Europol, Frontex, IntCen and SatCen. This trend corresponds 
with the reinforcement of the active pre-crisis approach focused on anticipation, early 
detection and warning of potential and substantial threats and disruptions. The EU as 
the security intelligence community took responsibility for establishing, developing 
and improving coordination between its relevant agencies and entities and the 
national intelligence services of the member states active in both civil and military 
fields. As a result, it has got access to the plenty of information sources and 
developed all range of mechanisms and tools enabling an efficient gathering and 
analysing of data and information referring to threats, risks and security concerns. 
This is a huge potential for building resilience of the EU security system on the basis 
of accurate, reliable and timely strategic security awareness connected with early-
warning mechanisms and crisis response schemes.  
The EU intelligence community is still decentralised and relied on varied 
cooperative networks. As such, it is subject to national predilections and habits which 
quite often restrict the scope of involvement in intelligence cooperation at EU level. 
The challenge of integration, cross-referencing and checking of all available 
information material must be met at the political level, demanding from EU top 
officials and representatives of the member states a more open and flexible attitude 
to information sharing and intelligence production.  
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